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Universality in voting behavior: an empirical analysis
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Department of Biomedical Engineering and Computational Science,
Aalto University School of Science, P.O. Box 12200, FI-00076, Finland
Election data represent a precious source of information to study human behavior at a large scale.
In proportional elections with open lists, the number of votes received by a candidate, rescaled
by the average performance of all competitors in the same party list, has the same distribution
regardless of the country and the year of the election. Here we provide the first thorough assessment
of this claim. We analyzed election datasets of 15 countries with proportional systems. We confirm
that a class of nations with similar election rules fulfill the universality claim. Discrepancies from
this trend in other countries with open-lists elections are always associated with peculiar differences
in the election rules, which matter more than differences between countries and historical periods.
Our analysis shows that the role of parties in the electoral performance of candidates is crucial:
alternative scalings not taking into account party affiliations lead to poor results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We know from statistical physics that systems of many
particles exhibit, in the aggregate, a behavior which is en-
forced by a few basic features of the individual particles,
but independent of all other characteristics. This result
is particularly striking in critical phenomena, like contin-
uous phase transitions and is known as universality [1].
Empirical evidence shows that a number of social phe-
nomena are also characterized by simple emergent behav-
ior out of the interactions of many individuals. The most
striking example is collective motion [2–4]. Therefore,
in the last years a growing community of scholars have
been analyzing large-scale social dynamics and propos-
ing simple microscopic models to describe it, alike the
minimalistic models used in statistical physics. Such sci-
entific endeavour, initially known by the name of socio-
physics [5–7], has been meanwhile augmented by scholars
and tools of other disciplines, like applied mathematics,
social and computer science, and is currently referred to
as computational social science [8].
Elections are among the largest social phenomena. In
India, USA and Brazil hundreds of million voters cast
their preferences on election day. Fortunately, datasets
can be freely downloaded from institutional sources, like
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of many countries. There-
fore, it is not surprising that elections have been among
the most studied social phenomena of the last decade [9].
By now, several aspects of voting behavior have been ex-
amined, like statistics of turnout rates [10, 11], detection
of election anomalies [12, 13], polarization and tactical
voting in mayoral elections [14, 15], the relation between
party size and temporal correlations [16], the relation be-
tween number of candidates and number of voters [17],
the emergence of third parties in bipartisan systems [18],
the correlation between the score of a party and the num-
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ber of its members [19], the classification of electoral cam-
paigns [20], etc.
The most studied feature is the distribution of the
number of votes of candidates [21–35]. In the first analy-
sis by Costa Filho et al. [21], the distribution of the frac-
tion of votes received by candidates in Brazilian federal
and state elections seems to decay as a power law with
exponent −1 in the central region. Following this finding
several similar analyses have been performed on election
data of various countries, like India [25], Indonesia [26]
and Mexico [28].
However, Fortunato and Castellano observed that the
analysis by Costa Filho et al. treats all candidates
equally, neglecting the role of the party in the electoral
performance [30]. This assumptions appears too strong
and unjustified, as the final score of the candidate is likely
to depend on whether his/her party is popular or not.
For this reason Fortunato and Castellano argued that
characterizing and modelling the competition of candi-
dates of the same party is more promising, as the perfor-
mance of the candidates would be mostly depending on
their own activity, rather than on external factors. Such
competition occurs in a peculiar type of voting system,
viz. proportional elections with open lists, where people
may vote for a party and one or more candidates. In
this system, people may actually choose their represen-
tatives by voting directly for them, whereas the number
of candidates entering the Parliament for a given party
typically depends on the strength of the party at the na-
tional and/or regional level. In these elections, it was
found that the distributions of the number of votes of a
candidate, divided by the average number of votes of all
party competitors in the same list, appear to be the same
regardless of the country and the year of the election [30].
This claim has been recently disputed by Araripe and
Costa Filho, who found that the universal curve com-
puted in Ref. [30] does not follow well the profile of the
distribution of Brazilian elections, which are also propor-
tional and with open lists.
Here we carry out the first comprehensive analysis of
2the distribution of candidates’ performance, using elec-
tion results of 15 countries. We focus on proportional
elections, as they feature the open-list system that al-
low voters to choose their representatives, enabling a real
competition between candidates. We conclude that the
relative performance, i.e. the ratio between the number
of votes of a candidate and the average score of his/her
party competitors in a given list has indeed the same dis-
tribution for countries with similar voting systems, and
that discrepancies from the universal distribution emerge
when the election has markedly different features (e.g.
large districts, compulsory voting and weak role of parties
in Brazil). We also show that party affiliations cannot be
neglected: statistics of the absolute performance of can-
didates of different parties, like that investigated in the
original analysis by Costa Filho et al., do not compare
well between countries.
II. RESULTS
A. Proportional elections
The electoral system we wish to study is proportional
representation (PR) [36]. We analyze data from parlia-
mentary elections of 15 countries: Italy (before 1992),
Poland, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Sweden, Belgium,
Switzerland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia,
Netherlands, Uruguay and Brazil. The basic principle
is that all voters deserve representation and all politi-
cal groups deserve to be represented in legislatures in
proportion to their strength in the electorate. In order
to achieve this ‘fair’ representation, the country is usu-
ally divided into multi-member districts, each district in
turn allocating a certain number of seats. Most coun-
tries having a PR system use a party list voting scheme
to allocate the seats among the parties – each political
party presents a list of candidates for each district. On
the ballot the voters indicate their preference to a polit-
ical party by selecting one or more candidates from the
list. The number of seats assigned to each party in a dis-
trict is proportional to the number of votes. The party
list systems can be categorized into open, semi-open and
closed.
Open lists Open lists enable voters to express their
preference not only among parties but also among candi-
dates. A party presents an unordered, random or alpha-
betically ordered list of candidates. Voters choose one or
more candidates, and not the party. The position of each
candidate depends entirely on the number of votes that
he/she receives. In this category, we have studied data
from Italy (before 1994, when a new system was intro-
duced), Poland, Finland, Denmark, Estonia (since 2002),
Greece, Switzerland, Slovenia, Brazil, Uruguay.
Semi-open lists Semi-open lists impose some restric-
tions on voters directly or indirectly. The voter votes for
either a party or a candidate within a party list. The
parties usually put up a list of candidates according to
their ‘initial’ preference, which depends on internal party
rankings, etc. Candidates conquer parliamentary seats
in the order they are ranked in the list, from the first
to the last. However, if a candidate gets a number of
votes exceeding a threshold, then he/she climbs up the
ranking even if he/she was initially at the bottom of the
list. The final order of the candidates is decided based
on the ‘initial’ ordering and the actual votes received by
the candidates. Sweden, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bel-
gium, Estonia (until 2002) and Netherlands fall in this
category.
Closed lists In the closed list system the party fixes
the order in which the candidates are listed and elected.
The voter casts a vote to a party as a whole and cannot
express his/her preference for any candidate or group of
candidates. The representatives are then selected as they
appear on the list, in the order defined before the elec-
tions. Countries voting with this system include Russia,
Italy (since 2006), Spain, Angola, South Africa, Israel,
Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Argentina, etc. We did not con-
sider this type of elections in our analysis, as there is no
real competition between the candidates.
The allocation of seats to the parties takes place
according to some pre-defined method, e.g. d’Hondt,
Hagenbach-Bischoff, Sainte-Lague¨, or some modified ver-
sion of these [37].
B. Distribution of candidates’ performance: open
lists
In every proportional election, the country is divided
into districts and each party presents a list with Q can-
didates. Voters typically choose one of the parties and
express their preference among the candidates of the se-
lected party. The seat allocation depends on the country
(see Section A of Appendix) and has a large influence on
how voters choose who they will vote for. The data sets
we considered contain information about the number of
votes vi that each candidate i received and the number
of candidates Qi of the party list li including candidate
i. From this information one can derive the total number
of votes Nli collected by the Qi candidates of list li. By
summing over all party lists in the district Di of candi-
date i we obtain the number of votes NDi in the district.
The total number of votes cast during the whole election
is indicated as NT .
Our analysis consists in computing the probability dis-
tribution of the number of votes received by candidates,
suitably normalized. We use the following normaliza-
tions:
• The scaling by Fortunato and Castellano [30],
where the number of votes vi of a candidate is di-
vided by the average number of votes v0 = Nli/Q
i
of all candidates in his/her party list. We shall in-
dicate it as FC scaling.
• The scaling by Costa Filho, Almeida, Andrade and
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FIG. 1: Distribution of electoral performance of candidates in proportional elections with open lists, according to FC scaling.
Italy (until 1992), Poland, Finland, Denmark and Estonia (after 2002) follow essentially the same rules, which is reflected by
the data collapse of panel F. The historical evolution of the countries does not seem to affect the shape of the distribution
(panels A to E).
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FIG. 2: Same analysis as in Fig. 1, for Slovenia, Greece, Switzerland, Brazil and Uruguay. Curves are fairly stable at the
national level, but they do not compare well across countries and with the universal curves of Fig.1 (represented in panel F by
the distribution for the Italian elections in 1987). Such discrepancies are likely to be due to the different election rules of these
countries as compared to each other and to the ones examined in Fig. 1, although they all adopt open lists.
Moreira (CAAM) [21], where one considers the
fraction of votes received by a candidate. Since
it is unclear to us what one exactly means by that,
we consider two possible normalizations: a) the
fraction of the total votes in the district, vi/NDi ;
b) the fraction of the total votes in the country
vi/NT . We shall refer to them as to CAAMd and
CAAMn, respectively. We rule out the fraction of
votes in the party list because the authors made
clear that they do not consider party affiliations.
The most sensible definition appears the normal-
ization at the district level, which will be thus re-
ported here. The results for CAAMn are shown in
the Appendix (Figs. B.1, B.2, B.3).
The universality discovered in Ref. [30] referred to elec-
tions held in Finland, Poland and Italy in various years.
Here we confirm the result with a larger number of data
sets (Fig. 1). Panels A, B and C display the distributions
for Italy, Poland and Finland, respectively, in different
years. The stability of the curve within the same country
is remarkable, especially on the tail. In panel F we com-
pare the distributions across the countries, yielding the
collapse found in Ref. [30]. Elections data in Denmark
4and Estonia (detailed in panels D and E), appear to fol-
low the universal curve as well. We indicate this class of
countries as Group U in the following. In Ref. [30] it was
shown that this universal curve is very well represented
by a log-normal function.
Italy (until 1992), Poland, Finland, Denmark and Es-
tonia (after 2002) use open lists [36], in which voters can
express their preference toward certain candidates within
the party list and have a direct influence on the list or-
dering. These lists use the plurality method for the al-
location of the seats within the party lists: candidates
with the largest number of nominative votes are declared
elected. There are just small differences in the number of
candidates that a voter can indicate, the ordering of the
candidates on the ballot, but the systems are basically
the same, justifying the observed universality.
Other countries using open lists are Slovenia, Greece,
Switzerland, Brazil, Uruguay. The results of the FC scal-
ing are illustrated in Fig 2. While there is a histori-
cal persistence of the distribution at the national level,
the curves do not really follow a common pattern, and
do not match well the behavior of the universal distri-
bution found for Italy, Poland, Finland, Denmark and
Estonia. We distinguish here two classes of behaviors:
Slovenia, Greece and Switzerland are characterized by a
pronounced peak at v/v0 = 1, and their tails match each
other quite well. Brazil and Uruguay exhibit a monotonic
pattern, quite different from the other three curves. The
Brazilian curve follows quite closely the profile of the uni-
versal curve of Fig. 1 on the tail (v/v0 > 1).
We conclude that open list systems do not guaran-
tee identical distributions, but can be grouped in classes
of behaviors. A close inspection of the election sys-
tems, however, may explain why we observe discrepan-
cies. Slovenia divides its territory into eight districts
which in turn are partitioned into 11 electoral units, each
giving one candidate in the district. The voters can cast
the vote for any of the candidates in the district, but the
election of the candidate depends on the number of votes
he/she won in his/her unit, i.e. the performance of the
candidate in the unit is more important than the number
of votes won in the district, which may affect both the
candidates’ campaigns and the voters’ choices.
Greece uses a very complex seat allocation method
among party lists and individual candidates. Although
the ranking of the candidates on the list and the seats
reallocation depends on the number of votes collected by
the candidate, if one of the candidates happens to be the
head of a party or a current or ex Prime Minister he/she
is set automatically at the top of the party list, regardless
of his/her electoral performance. Additionally, voting is
compulsory, so many people cast a vote because they
have to, without an informed opinion and/or motivation
to participate in the election.
In Switzerland, voters may cast as many votes as there
are seats in the district. They may vote for all members of
the list, or for candidates of more than one party. Voters
are also allowed to cast two votes per candidate. This
type of list is classified as free list.
In Brazil, like in Greece, voting is compulsory, and we
cannot exclude that this plays a role on the shape of
the distribution. In addition, each state is just one dis-
trict, which then comprises a number of voters orders of
magnitude larger than the typical districts in all other
elections. This explains why the Brazilian curve spans a
much larger range of values for the performance variable
than all other curves. The huge number of voters in the
same district also explains why parties present very long
lists of candidates (often with over one hundred names).
Finally, the role of parties is very weak; the political con-
stellation frequently changes, with new parties being cre-
ated and old ones being reshaped.
In Uruguay voters cannot choose candidates, but lists
of candidates presented by the parties, the so-called sub-
lemas. Therefore our analysis focuses on the distribution
of performance of sub-lemas, instead of that of single
candidates.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the analogues of Figs. 1 and 2 ob-
tained by using CAAMd scaling. The historical stability
of the corresponding distributions at the national level
holds, however the comparison across countries is poor:
curves appear to cross, not to collapse (panel F). Accord-
ing to Costa Filho et al. [21] the central part of the Brazil-
ian curve follows a power law, with exponent close to 1;
power law fits of the central region of the other distribu-
tions yield exponents sensibly different from each other,
which confirms the crossing of the curves (see Table C.1
of Appendix). In particular, we cound not identify any
portion of the Polish curve resembling a power law. We
conclude that the fraction of votes v/ND collected by a
candidate in his/her electoral district does not follow the
same probability distribution in different countries, not
even when they have essentially identical voting schemes,
as in Figs. 1 and 3.
C. Distribution of candidates’ performance:
semi-open lists
The other countries we considered use semi-open lists,
with different thresholds for the number of preferences
that candidates are required to collect in order to se-
cure a seat in the Parliament. The higher the electoral
quota is, the harder is for a candidate to reach the re-
quired number of votes. In this case the position of the
candidate within the party, as it appears on the ballot,
has more influence on his/her final rank than the num-
ber of votes he/she collected. This can drastically effect
the motivation of the candidate to lead a personal cam-
paign. Also, high quotas diminish the influence of the
voter on the final list ordering, which affects both the
degree of a candidate’s involvement in his/her personal
campaign and the way people cast their preference votes.
Therefore there is hardly an open competition between
candidates, and this may be reflected in the shape of the
distribution of performance. Figure 5 shows the prob-
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FIG. 3: Same analysis as in Fig. 1, with CAAMd scaling. Curves are stable at the national level, but they do not compare
well across countries.
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FIG. 4: Same analysis as in Fig. 2, with CAAMd scaling. Curves are stable at the national level, but they do not compare
well across countries.
ability density distributions for different countries with
semi-open lists, according to FC scaling. The elections
in Czech Republic held in 2010 had the lowest electoral
quota and P (v/v0) (Fig. 5D) turns out to be very sim-
ilar to the curve obtained for Greek elections (Fig. 3B).
The country with the highest electoral quota are the
Netherlands, where each candidate has to win 10% of
votes cast on the national level in order to be directly
elected. Voters in Netherlands have little or no influence
on the ordering of candidates, which is essentially frozen
by the party, and they often vote for the top-ranked can-
didate and the first several names on the list, as they are
the most popular and appreciated members of the party.
This resembles the rich-gets-richer effect, which is char-
acterized by power-law behavior of the distribution of
the relevant quantities [38–42]. Indeed, the distribution
of performance of Dutch candidates follow an approxi-
mate power-law behavior over most of the range of the
performance v/v0 (Fig. 5F).
Besides the values of the electoral threshold, these
countries also differ in the number of nominative pref-
erences a voter can cast, in the size and number of
multi-member districts, as well as in the electoral for-
mula that determines the final rankings (see Section A of
Appendix). Any change in the electoral system, i.e. these
several factors, might influence the shape of P (v/v0). For
instance, in 1994 Slovakia changed the number of multi-
member districts, leading to appreciable changes in the
shape of the distribution (Fig. 5C). The change in the
electoral quota and the number of nominative votes de-
cided in Czech Republic in 2006, may be the responsible
for the variation of the curve before and after that year
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FIG. 5: Distribution of electoral performance of candidates in proportional elections with semi-open lists, according to FC
scaling. Voters may express preferences for the candidates, but this plays a role for the final seat assignments only if the
number of votes obtained by a candidate exceeds a given threshold, which varies from a country to another. At the national
level curves are mostly stable, significant discrepancies correspond to changes in the election rules, like in Slovakia (C), Czech
Republic (D) and Estonia (E). The apparent power law of the Dutch curve (F) might be generated by a rich-gets-richer
mechanism, since the threshold is very high (10% at the national level) and voters typically tend to support the candidates
based on their popularity. We stress that Estonia since 2002 has adopted open lists, which is why distributions of Estonian
elections after 2002 are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 (labeled as Estonia I).
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FIG. 6: Same as Fig. 5, with CAAMd scaling.
(Fig. 5D). The transition from semi-open to open lists
introduced in Estonia in 2002, might explain why the
curves before and after that year look different (Fig. 1E
versus Fig. 5E). Interestingly, after the introduction of
open lists in Estonia, the distribution of performance
matches the universal distribution of the other countries
with similar election systems (Fig. 1F), while before 2002
we find clear discrepancies.
The corresponding distributions with CAAMd scaling
also show marked differences between different countries
(Fig. 6).
D. Estimating the similarity of the distributions
So far the estimation of the agreement or disagreement
of different curves has been basically visual. In this sec-
tion we would like to attempt a quantitative assessment
of this issue. We build two matrices, whose entries are
the values of the average distanceDavg and the maximum
distance Dmax between the distributions for any pair of
countries for which we gathered election data (see Meth-
ods). The dissimilarity values for elections in the same
country are reported on one diagonal of the matrix. Since
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FIG. 7: Quantitative assessment of the similarity between distributions at the national level and between countries. The
matrices in the top row indicate the values of the average K-S distance between datasets of different countries. On the
bottom row the maximum distances are reported. Each column corresponds to one of the three types of distributions we have
examined, by using FC, CAAMd and CAAMn scaling. A color code is adopted to better distinguish the low values of the
distance (indicated by the blue), indicating a big similarity between the curves, from the larger values, corresponding to poor
collapses. The bluish square on the bottom left of the matrices obtained via FC scaling confirm that the distributions of those
countries are pretty close to each other, as illustrated in Fig. 1F. Conversely, the similarity between distributions obtained via
CAAMd and CAAMn scaling appears rather modest for most pairs of countries.
we have adopted three different types of scaling for the
electoral performance of candidates, FC, CAAMd and
CAAMn, we end up with six matrices, which are illus-
trated in Fig. 7. In each column we display the pair of
matrices corresponding to one type of scaling, the first
row contains the average distances, the second row the
maximum distances. We built 16 × 16 matrices, even if
we studied 15 countries, because we considered two sets
of elections for Estonia, because of their transition from
semi-open lists (Ee II) to open lists (Ee II), which took
place in 2002.
Potential data collapses are indicated by low values of
Davg and Dmax, which are easier to spot by using a color
code, as we did in the figure. Numerical values are listed
in the Appendix in the Tables C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6,
C.7. Dark squares (black-blue) correspond to the lowest
values ofDavg andDmax, so to very similar distributions.
The data collapse for the countries of Group U (Fig. 1F)
is illustrated by the bottom left block of A and B. In-
terestingly, we see that only the Estonian elections held
after 2002 (Ee I) are very similar to the other curves of
Group U; before 2002 Estonians used semi-open lists, the
corresponding curves do not match well with the univer-
sal distribution.
We see that also the Brazilian and the Uruguayan dis-
tributions are fairly similar, on average, to the universal
curve, mostly on the tail, although they considerably dif-
fer in the initial part, especially the Brazilian distribu-
tions. The strong similarity between the results of elec-
tions in the nations of Group U persists even if we con-
sider the maximum distance (panel B), as the dark block
is still there, though blurred. Slovenia and Greece appear
very similar to each other but sensibly different from the
other countries. The diagonal from bottom left to top
right shows the values of the distance for datasets in the
same country. In general, the distances are pretty low,
but we also find fairly large values. These correspond to
countries which introduced changes in the election rules,
reflected in the shape of the distributions, as described
above.
If we move to CAAMd scaling (panels C and D) the
scenario is considerably worse, in that the curves are
much more dissimilar to each other than the ones ob-
tained with FC scaling. In panel C, the average distance
between the countries of Group U is still low, though
higher than for FC scaling (panel A), but when one moves
to the maximum distance the block disappears (panel D).
For CAAMn (panels E and F) the curves are even more
dissimilar to each other.
We are not giving here any indication on the signifi-
cance of the measured values of the K-S distance. Large
values indicate with certainty that the corresponding dis-
tributions are really different curves, but low values could
still have high significance. As a matter of fact, all val-
8ues that we found, for all types of scaling, indicate a
significant discrepancy between the corresponding distri-
butions. However, we stress that here we are considering
the whole profile of the distribution, from the lowest to
the highest value of the performance variable. The most
interesting part of the distributions, and the one which is
likely to reflect collective social dynamics, is certainly the
tail, because it is where one has the largest cascades of
votes for the same individual. On the contrary, the initial
part of the curve corresponds to poorly voted candidates,
and there are many ways to get to such modest outcomes
(like being voted solely by closest family members and
friends), hardly susceptible of a mathematical modelling.
But at this stage we did not want to identify the most
“interesting” part of the distribution by constraining the
range of the variable, which is always tricky. Therefore
we decided to compare the full distributions.
We finally remark that in social dynamics one can
hardly get the same striking data collapses obtained in
physical systems and models. Even if the social atom
hypothesis implies that just a few features of the social
actors and their interactions determine the large-scale
behavior, the complexity of human nature and context-
dependent factors may still have some influence, albeit
small. For instance, in the Polish distributions of Fig.
1B there is a hump for v/v0 ≈ 5, which occurs system-
atically at the national level, but which is absent in the
other distributions of the same class. Therefore, obtain-
ing the agreement of the distributions shown in Fig. 1F,
despite all differences between countries and historical
ages, is truly remarkable.
III. DISCUSSION
We have performed an empirical analysis of elections
held in 15 countries in various years. We focused on the
competition between candidates, which is a truly open
competition when the voters can indicate their favourite
representatives in the ballot and candidates with the
largest number of votes are ranked the highest. This
occurs in proportional elections with open lists. Of the
countries for which we found data, 10 adopt open lists.
Five of them (Group U), Italy, Finland, Poland, Den-
mark and Estonia (since 2002) have very similar election
rules, the other five are characterized by important dif-
ferences (e.g. compulsory vote, huge districts and weak
role of parties in Brazil), which are likely to affect the
behavior of voters and candidates, leading to measur-
able differences in the statistical properties of the elec-
toral outcomes. Indeed, the distribution of the number
of votes received by a candidate, normalized by the av-
erage number of votes gained by his/her competitors in
the same party list, seems to be the same for the nations
of Group U, while there are marked differences from the
curves obtained from the other countries. This result,
originally found by Fortunato and Castellano for Italy,
Finland and Poland [30], is confirmed here on a much
larger data collections and holds for Denmark and Esto-
nia as well.
Different patterns are found for countries adopting
semi-open lists, in which in principle voters can choose
the candidates, but the main ranking criterion is still
imposed by their party, regardless of the final electoral
score of the candidate, unless it exceeds a given threshold.
In this system the competition among the candidates is
therefore not really open, and it is no wonder that the
distribution of electoral performance does not follow the
profile of the curves of Group U.
In general we found that the shape of the distribution is
much more sensitive to the specific election rules adopted
in the countries than to the historical and cultural con-
text where the election took place. This is evident when
one considers the evolution in time of distributions of any
given country, which remain essentially identical even af-
ter many years, if the voting system does not change,
but display visible variations following the introduction
and/or modification of election rules as it happened in
Estonia in 2002, Slovakia in 1994, Czech Republic in
2006. The case of Estonia is spectacular: before 2002
it used semi-open lists, and the distributions of relative
performance of a candidate with respect to his/her party
competitors did not compare well with the curves of the
other countries of Group U. After the introduction of
open lists, instead, the distributions became very similar
to the universal curve. Such sensitivity of the distribu-
tions might allow to detect anomalies, e.g. large-scale
fraud, in future elections [12, 13].
Our analysis proves that the success of a candidate,
measured by the number of votes, strongly depends on
the party he/she belongs to, and that only when one
considers the competition among candidates of the same
party universal signatures may emerge. Indeed, neglect-
ing the party affiliation does not seem to take us very
far: the two party-independent normalizations we have
considered, following the procedure by Costa Filho et
al. [21, 23, 32], do not seem to reveal strong common fea-
tures among distributions of different countries, not even
when the latter follow nearly identical election schemes
(e.g. the nations of Group U).
IV. METHODS
A. Election data
Here we consider the data sets for parliamentary
elections from 15 countries with open and semi-open
lists: Italy (1958, 1972, 1976, 1979 and 1987) [43],
Poland (2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011) [44], Finland
(1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007) [45], Denmark (1990,
1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011) [46], Estonia
(1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) [47], Slovenia
(2004, 2008 and 2011) [48], Greece (2007 and 2009)
[49], Switzerland (2007 and 2011) [50], Brazil (elec-
tions for state deputies in 2002, 2006 and 2010) [51],
9Uruguay (2004 and 2009) [52], Sweden (2006 and 2010)
[53], Belgium (2007 and 2010) [54], Slovakia (1994,
1998, 2002, 2010 and 2012) [55, 56], Czech Republic
(2002, 2006 and 2010) [57] and the Netherlands (2010
and 2012) [58]. Further details and sources for each
file are given in Table C.8 in Appendix, while the
compiled and cleaned data maybe be downloaded at
http://becs.aalto.fi/en/research/complex_systems/elections/.
B. Comparing distributions
We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance [59] to
measure the dissimilarity of two empirical distributions.
The K-S distance D is defined as the maximum value of
the absolute difference between the corresponding cumu-
lative distribution functions, i.e.
D = max
x
|SN1(x) − SN2(x)| (1)
where SN1(x) and SN2(x) are the cumulative distribu-
tions for two data sets of size N1 and N2.
Since we have multiple datasets for each country, in
order to compute the dissimilarity of the distributions at
the national level and across countries we proceed as fol-
lows. For a given country X we compute the distance
between any two distributions for elections of X . For a
pair of countries X and Y we compute the distance be-
tween any pair of distributions PX and PY , correspond-
ing to one dataset of X and one of Y , respectively. In
both cases we take the average Davg and the maximum
Dmax of the resulting values. In this way we estimate
the average and the maximum distance between distri-
butions of the same country and between distributions of
two different countries.
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Appendix A: Description of election systems
a. Italy During 1948 to 1992, the members of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) were elected by
proportional representation (PR) in multi-member electoral districts, except in Valle d’Aosta where one member was
elected by simple majority. Over this legislative period, Italy used an open-list PR system in which voters could decide
to use as many as 3 (4 for very large districts) preference votes for individual candidates on the party list of their
choice. However, in 1992 this number was limited to unity. In each constituency, seats were divided between open
lists using the largest remainder method with the Imperiali quota, and the remaining votes and seats were transferred
to the national level, where special closed lists of national leaders received the last seats using the Hare quota.
b. Poland The lower chamber of the Polish parliament, the Sejm, has 460 seats out of which 391 are elected
in the multi-member districts and 69 at the national level. The seats within the district are allocated to a party or
independent list according to d’Hondt method, and reallocation to the candidates on each list is done according to
plurality rule.
c. Finland The Finnish parliament, Eduskunta, has 200 seats, distributed among 15 multi-member districts.
The candidates are nominated by a political party. A political party presents a list for each district, with at least 14
candidates. In Finland there is no electoral threshold and all seats are allocated within the electoral constituencies.
The voter is presented with the ballots from each party, and he/she cast a vote for one candidate only, expressing this
way a preference toward a certain candidate, but also towards a certain party. The allocation of the seats is according
to d’Hondt constituency list system.
d. Denmark The parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Folketing, is composed of 179 members directly
elected by a two-tier, six-stage proportional representation system. 135 of the total 175 members that represent
metropolitan Denmark are chosen in multi-member electoral districts grouped into three electoral regions, while the
remaining 40 seats are allocated to ensure proportionality at a national level. Voters may cast a ballot for a district
party list, or for a specific candidate. From 1970 to 2005 the seats within the constituencies were distributed according
to the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method of PR, while since 2007 the seats are distributed according to the d’Hondt or
largest average method of PR. The seats on the national level are apportioned among political parties that obtain
at least one district seat, or obtained as many votes as on average were cast per constituency seat in at least two
of the three regions, or at least two percent of all valid votes cast at the national level. The total number of seats
to which each cartel is entitled is determined using the d’Hondt method. From this total number is then subtracted
the number of constituency seats won by associated lists within each district. The difference gives the number of the
forty supplemental seats to which the party is entitled. Seats awarded on the national level are reallocated to each
party’s component constituency lists by a two-step procedure. Seats are first allocated to regions, by the Sainte-Lague¨
method. Then, within regions, they are allocated to constituencies by another divisor method. These seats are then
re reallocated to each list’s candidates, by three different procedures.
e. Estonia We consider the data from the elections to the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) for the period of two
decades (1992-2012) during which there were two reforms in the electoral system in 1994 and 2002 [61]. Keeping in
mind the years of these reforms, the data sets for Estonian elections can be categorized into three groups: 1992 as
the first group, the second consists of the data from the elections held in 1995 and 1999, and in the third we consider
elections after the second reform, that of 2003. The rules used in elections in 1992 were partly similar to those used in
Finland [60]. The country was divided into 12 multi-member districts whose magnitudes ranged from five to thirteen
seats, whereas the whole Estonian parliament consists of 101 members. Each party presented a list of candidates and
voters voted for an individual candidate. Candidates who received a Hare quota were certified as personally elected.
The remainder of votes were added by the list, and if full quota materialized, the top voted candidates on the list
received district seats. Unlike Finland, where the seats are allocated in the district, the remained unallocated seats
were compiled nationwide and appointed to closed lists of parties that received at least five percent of the votes on
national level. For the allocation on the national level the quasi-d’Hondt quota was used [60]. This kind of system
led to selection of candidate which had only 51 personal votes. For this reasons, a restriction for district seats was
introduced for the elections held in 1995: in order to be chosen, a candidate had to win at least the number of votes
equal to 0.1 of quota. The reform in 2002 was related to lists at the national level, the ordering of the candidates was
according to the number of their personal votes. In this sense the later reform, the transition from semi-open to open
lists led to a greater personalization of the electoral system in Estonia [61].
f. Slovenia In Slovenia, the deputies of the National Assembly (Drzˇavni zbor), with the exception of the two
representatives of minorities, are elected by proportional representation, with a 4% electoral threshold required at the
national level. The country is divided into eight territorial constituencies, each represented by eleven elected deputies.
For the elections of the representatives of the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities, two special constituencies
are formed, one for each minority. The deputies representing the minorities are elected on the basis of the majority
principle. The seat allocation within the districts is as follows: each list gets as many seats as there are whole Hare
quotas contained in its vote within the district. Seats unallocated within the districts are aggregated at the national
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level and distributed by PR-d’Hondt rule, on the basis of each party remainder vote (the sum of all remainders from
associated constituency lists). Only lists which won at least three seats are eligible to participate in this step of seat
allocation. The party seats won on the national level are reallocated to the lists according to their ranking. The lists
within the party are ranked according to their remainder is expressed as a fraction of the quota in its constituency.
The lists from constituencies all of whose seats have already been allocated are not considered in the apportionment
of national seats. The seats awarded to the lists are reallocated to each list’s candidates as follows and candidates on
each list are associated with one (or two) geographically defined sub-districts. The candidates on each list are ranked
in terms of the percentage of the total vote each has received in his or her sub-district. The top candidates on the
list get the seats to which their list is entitled.
g. Greece The Hellenic Parliamnet is composed of 300 deputies elected for four-year term through reinforced
proportional representation system. Greece is divided into 56 districts, out of which 48 have more than one rep-
resentatives in the Parliament. The winning party on the national level in Greece receives a majority bonus of 40
in 2007 (50 in 2009), while the remaining 260 (250 in 2009) seats are distributed by the largest remainder method
(Hagenbach-Bischoff) of proportional representation (PR) on a nationwide basis among parties polling at least 3%
of the vote. The voters can express their preference toward certain candidates on the the party list. The number
of preference votes depends on the number of seats in constituency. Single-member seats were filled by the plurality
or first-past-the-post method, in which the candidate obtaining the largest number of votes in the constituency was
elected to office. In multimember districts the seats won by party are reallocated to each list’s candidates by plurality.
The only exception are the party heads and acting or past Prime Ministers who are automatically placed at the top
of their party list.
h. Switzerland The National Council (Nationalrat/Conseil National/Consiglio Nazionale/Cussegl Naziunal) is
composed of 200 members elected for a 4-year term of office in 26 constituencies - the cantons of Switzerland. The
electors have as many votes as there are allocated seats for the district. These votes can be given to all candidates
on a single list or to candidates from different lists. The seats apportionment within the constituency is based on
Hagenbach-Bischoff method, while the list seats are assigned to the candidates with the largest vote totals within
each list. Like in Poland, Finland, Denmark and Estonia, the voters have total control on who will represent them in
parliament.
i. Brazil In Brazil, the elections for the 513 seats of the Chamber of Deputies (Caˆmara dos Deputados) of the
National Congress are conducted in 27 multi-member (8 to 70 seats, based on population) constituencies corresponding
to the country’s 26 states and the Federal district, using the party-list proportional system with seats allotted according
to the simple quotient and highest average calculations. The seats won by each list are in turn awarded to the
candidates on the basis of preferential votes cast by the electorate. Vacancies arising between general elections are
filled by substitutes elected at the same time as titular members. If no substitute is available and there remain at
least 15 months before the end of the term of the member concerned, by-elections are held. Furthermore, voting is
compulsory, and abstention being punishable by a fine.
j. Uruguay The Chamber of Deputies (Ca´mara de Diputados) in Uruguay has 99 seats allocated in 19 multi-
member districts through a list proportional representation system. The members of the Chamber are elected for
5 year term. Voting is compulsory in Uruguay and unjustified abstention is penalized by a fine. The elections for
Chamber are in the same time as the elections for the Senate and presidential elections. For each district the party
can present more then one list, so called sub-lemas containing usually a pair of candidates or more. Uruguay uses
the rule of the double simultaneous vote (DSV), which means that the voter must vote for one of the sub-lemas of
the party he/she has chosen in a Presidential contest. The distribution of seats between political parties or cartels is
decided by tallying the votes of each sub-lemas. The allocation of the seats is done according to variation of d’Hondt
formula devised by Borelli. The possible remaining seats are distributed on the national level. Although the voters
can not cast a vote for a single member but for the sub-lemas, we can use the quantity v/v0 for measuring performance
of the sub-lemas since the parties propose several sub-lemas which usually contain two or three names. The data we
consider here, have information about the number of votes cast for each of the lists. The performance of the sub-lema
is expressed as the relation between the number of votes won by sub-lema and number of votes won in average by all
sub-lemas proposed by a party or cartel in the district.
k. Sweden The elections to the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) uses open lists system, but unlike in countries
previously discussed, the voters can choose between three different types of ballots papers: the party ballot paper
which has simply the name of the party, the name ballot paper has a party name followed by a list of candidates and
alternatively, a voter can take blank ballot paper and write a party name on it. Voters in Sweden can either vote for
a party without expressing a preference towards any candidate, or can vote for a person on the list, thereby giving
the voice to one candidate and indirectly to his/her party. Seats are allocated among the Swedish political parties
proportionally using a modified form of the Saint-Lague¨ method. The candidates from the each party are determined
according by two factors: the candidate’s ranking by their party and the number of preference votes the obtained
in the elections. If the candidate receives a number of personal votes equal or greater than 8% of the party’s total
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amount of votes, he/she will be automatically shifted to the top of the list, regardless of the previous ranking. This
type of system gives the voters a degree of power in choosing candidates from the list, but not as much as in the
case of Poland. This is reflected in the way people cast their votes and how the performance of the candidates are
distributed.
l. Belgium In Belgium, the Chamber (Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des Reprsen-
tants/Abgeordnetenkammer) seats are filled in eleven constituencies. The political parties present the lists of
candidates and voters can either indicate a preference for one or more of them, or vote for a party. The seats are
distributed in each district among the lists that receive at least of all valid votes cast in the constituency according
to d’Hondt system. The ordering of the candidates on the lists is similar to Sweden, i.e. it is a combination of party
ordering and nominative votes.
m. Slovakia For Slovakia we consider several election years 1994, 1998, 2002, 2010 and 2012 during which there
were three reforms of electoral system, 1998, 1999 and 2004 [61]. The National council (Na´rodna´ rada) of the Slovakian
parliament consists of 150 members chosen for four year term on proportional representation elections. For the elections
in 1994 the country was divided into four multi-member constituencies. Each political party was nominating their
candidates, by submitting the list of not more than 50 candidates in each constituency. The voters were allowed to
vote for four candidates on the list of the same party, expressing this way their preference toward certain candidates.
The seat allocation among the parties within the constituency was according to the Hagenbach-Bischoff system. All
parties with more than 5% of the votes on national level took part in the seat distribution. Within individual political
parties the mandates were distributed among candidates nominated by these parties in the order of priority of the
list of candidates. If some of the candidates gained at least 10% of preferential votes of the total number of votes cast
for a political party within a constituency, he/she had an advantage over other candidates on the list, regardless of
his/hers previously determined order. If the political party had the right to several mandates, and several candidates
met the conditions specified in the previous sentence, then the candidates obtained mandates in the order which
was determined by the largest number of preferential votes, cast for them. In case of equal preferential votes, the
position of candidate for Deputy in the list of candidates was decisive. After the elections in 1994, Slovakia became
one, nationwide electoral constituency, where political parties or coalitions could submit lists of 150 candidates. This
semi-open list system puts elections in Slovakia between elections in Netherlands, where the voters do not have an
influence on the seat allocation within the party, and countries like Finland and Poland, where the ordering of the
candidates solely depends on the preference of the voters.
n. Czech Republic The lower house of the Czech Republic, the Chamber of deputies (Poslanecka´ sneˇmovna) is
composed of 200 members directly elected by proportional elections. The apportionment of Chamber seats in each of
the fourteen multi-member districts among competing lists is done using d’Hondt rule. In order to participate in the
distribution of constituency seats, a party must obtain at least 5% of all valid votes cast at the national level, while
coalitions of 2, 3 and 4 or more parties are required to obtain at least 10, 15 and 20 percent of the vote (previously
7, 9 and 11 percent) respectively. The electoral reforms of 2000 changed the number of preferences to 2 and the seats
within the list are allocated to candidates in the order in which they appear on the list, but the candidates which
received at least 7% (reduced from 10%) of the votes cast for their party list have priority in the allocation of seats,
regardless of their position on the list. This was followed in the elections of 2002 and 2006. However in 2010, the
preferences were set to 4 and the amount of necessary preferences for the relevant candidate was reduced to 5%.
o. Netherlands The House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) has a particular way of allocating seats. Each
party can represent the list of 50 candidates (80 if the party had more than 15 seats in the previous term) with
predetermined ordering of the candidates. The first person on the list, list puller, is usually appointed by the party to
lead its election campaign and is a candidate for the Prime Minister. Although, parties may choose to compete with
the different candidates in each district, the seat allocation on the national level results in nationwide lists. Since, the
voters cannot influence the ordering of the candidates, i.e. the lists are of closed types, they often vote for the list
puller and first several candidates on the list, as the more popular and appreciated members of the party.
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Appendix B: CAAMn scaling
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FIG. B.1: Distributions of the fraction of votes obtained by a candidate within the entire country for different election years
for (A) Italy, (B) Poland, (C) Finland, (D) Denmark, (E) Estonia (2003, 2007, 2011). A comparison of the scaling curves for
these countries is shown in (F).
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
P(
v/N
T)
Slovenia
A
2004
2008
2011 10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
Greece
B
2007
2009 10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
Switzerland C
2007
2011
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
P(
v/N
T)
v/NT
Brazil
D
2002
2006
2010 10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
v/NT
Uruguay
E
2004
2009 10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1
v/NT
F
Slovenia 2011
Greece 2009
Switzerland 2011
Brazil 2010
Uruguay 2009
FIG. B.2: Distributions of the fraction of votes obtained by a candidate within the whole country for different election years
for Slovenia, ( Greece, (C) Switzerland, (D) Brazil and (E) Uruguay. A comparison of the scaling curves for these countries is
shown in (F).
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FIG. B.3: Distributions of the fraction of votes obtained by a candidate within the whole country for different election years
in (A) Sweden, (B) Belgium, (C) Slovakia, (D) Czech Republic, (E) Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999), and (F) Netherlands.
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Appendix C: Tables
TABLE C.1: The estimates of γ exponent for CAAMd scaling for open-list electoral systems. For Poland and Uruguay, it is
not possible to find any finite range of values for which a power-law could be fitted.
Country Year xmin xmax γ
Italy 1958 0.00021 0.04871 −1.27(4)
Poland n.d. n.d. n.d.
Finland 1999 0.00036 0.02879 −1.11(3)
Denmark 2007 0.00063 0.02959 −1.08(3)
Estonia 2011 0.00330 0.08730 −1.47(5)
Greece 2007 0.00008 0.03403 −1.10(4)
Switzerland 2007 0.00063 0.02795 −1.21(4)
Brazil 2006 0.00007 0.00968 −1.12(1)
Uruguay n.d. n.d. n.d.
TABLE C.2: FC scaling: Average distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.03801 0.06560 0.05380 0.09199 0.07412 0.15788 0.37039 0.29121 0.45663 0.23223 0.14801 0.19722 0.28724 0.27584 0.12724 0.65437
Fi 0.02592 0.10756 0.06669 0.11274 0.16889 0.31749 0.23889 0.40258 0.25590 0.14209 0.23261 0.23913 0.30750 0.07937 0.67421
Pl 0.04236 0.12456 0.07161 0.15240 0.41216 0.33374 0.49942 0.21605 0.18217 0.17276 0.32289 0.25497 0.16750 0.64148
Dk 0.08410 0.12214 0.16958 0.31303 0.23599 0.39847 0.23272 0.13046 0.23501 0.23729 0.29784 0.09915 0.64581
EeI 0.05032 0.11546 0.40584 0.32818 0.48532 0.20248 0.13599 0.14914 0.34322 0.22991 0.17743 0.62883
EeII 0.14210 0.43881 0.36203 0.51480 0.14974 0.16591 0.11289 0.37911 0.19494 0.21826 0.56205
Si 0.06288 0.08608 0.11806 0.46576 0.33138 0.52184 0.18294 0.56076 0.25497 0.82169
Gr 0.02087 0.17273 0.39836 0.26706 0.44342 0.14608 0.48803 0.18109 0.77310
Ch 0.17259 0.53076 0.39489 0.59665 0.22172 0.63361 0.34065 0.86106
Br 0.08174 0.16535 0.12180 0.42645 0.16871 0.28469 0.43365
Uy 0.11100 0.23317 0.29583 0.27973 0.16721 0.55188
Se 0.07814 0.45601 0.14886 0.29123 0.49503
Be 0.16144 0.51014 0.18404 0.80793
Sk 0.18281 0.35344 0.45883
Cz 0.11962 0.69293
Nl 0.10844
TABLE C.3: FC scaling: Maximum distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.07070 0.09998 0.10859 0.16108 0.10361 0.21909 0.43408 0.31982 0.54035 0.31357 0.20025 0.24036 0.33814 0.40206 0.26237 0.69261
Fi 0.03241 0.14086 0.13231 0.13737 0.25200 0.35904 0.24493 0.46759 0.33103 0.16655 0.27059 0.26516 0.42020 0.19063 0.71052
Pl 0.05897 0.19237 0.08694 0.19499 0.47491 0.36068 0.57986 0.29779 0.24170 0.22232 0.37147 0.38301 0.29832 0.67978
Dk 0.18642 0.20043 0.30713 0.45101 0.33843 0.54346 0.34308 0.18052 0.32110 0.36328 0.44594 0.28313 0.69737
EeI 0.07077 0.18239 0.45052 0.34142 0.54968 0.28357 0.18697 0.20743 0.37557 0.36842 0.29624 0.67421
EeII 0.20064 0.55498 0.44567 0.64241 0.27050 0.26773 0.21713 0.48052 0.36279 0.40379 0.64199
Si 0.06963 0.12116 0.18554 0.55632 0.38073 0.57478 0.20762 0.66732 0.34597 0.85289
Gr 0.02087 0.23365 0.46823 0.27242 0.46320 0.16256 0.57763 0.23186 0.79092
Ch 0.17259 0.62214 0.45975 0.65662 0.34539 0.73473 0.45101 0.88318
Br 0.11955 0.23797 0.16632 0.51099 0.22314 0.43536 0.50603
Uy 0.11100 0.27942 0.31512 0.35771 0.23877 0.59656
Se 0.07814 0.49512 0.23553 0.41632 0.56354
Be 0.16144 0.62021 0.24679 0.83190
Sk 0.30812 0.54228 0.58983
Cz 0.17079 0.77514
Nl 0.10844
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TABLE C.4: CAAMd scaling: Average distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.06929 0.24181 0.19605 0.43669 0.39816 0.37895 0.71540 0.16986 0.20398 0.15814 0.49786 0.19310 0.17631 0.51498 0.13853 0.82727
Fi 0.04488 0.09237 0.22718 0.17321 0.18166 0.54486 0.12413 0.07568 0.34413 0.38077 0.20539 0.13957 0.59584 0.31366 0.90123
Pl 0.05296 0.30310 0.24112 0.21381 0.62367 0.10381 0.05648 0.31814 0.44676 0.17102 0.07638 0.59226 0.28284 0.89917
Dk 0.14625 0.14076 0.23600 0.34091 0.28756 0.28417 0.50810 0.23662 0.40870 0.35072 0.71065 0.48959 0.93467
EeI 0.16015 0.20126 0.41525 0.26706 0.23025 0.49047 0.31402 0.35743 0.29123 0.70049 0.46403 0.94112
EeII 0.27932 0.49650 0.26027 0.20853 0.48211 0.36498 0.32008 0.25375 0.69835 0.45156 0.94359
Si 0.12409 0.55850 0.59761 0.75097 0.27246 0.70531 0.66668 0.87455 0.74770 0.98217
Gr 0.02514 0.08957 0.23211 0.37571 0.18430 0.12873 0.53297 0.22762 0.85404
Ch 0.03784 0.31057 0.40198 0.16720 0.09645 0.57467 0.27950 0.89779
Br 0.04599 0.53713 0.20996 0.31572 0.42003 0.09011 0.77025
Uy 0.07334 0.50697 0.48601 0.75089 0.54306 0.93769
Se 0.31276 0.19498 0.51565 0.20655 0.82880
Be 0.07014 0.60935 0.27882 0.92955
Sk 0.37043 0.45729 0.64184
Cz 0.14945 0.79005
Nl 0.11057
TABLE C.5: CAAMd scaling: Maximum distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.09564 0.31050 0.27939 0.59191 0.51746 0.56189 0.79147 0.21808 0.25947 0.20313 0.54676 0.29096 0.24784 0.59231 0.19929 0.83707
Fi 0.06399 0.12927 0.37020 0.25594 0.31480 0.60435 0.14990 0.10232 0.38160 0.40233 0.32485 0.17915 0.75149 0.40082 0.91477
Pl 0.07079 0.46116 0.33911 0.40269 0.69504 0.11828 0.07156 0.34448 0.46076 0.29170 0.13499 0.72876 0.36182 0.91553
Dk 0.27609 0.28350 0.46215 0.52053 0.38945 0.41921 0.61449 0.31473 0.61296 0.50386 0.89750 0.65247 0.95876
EeI 0.16015 0.32867 0.52946 0.32185 0.31209 0.55802 0.33626 0.53202 0.39225 0.87834 0.58936 0.95553
EeII 0.40882 0.70318 0.35761 0.36411 0.59422 0.47135 0.57410 0.44274 0.90111 0.62867 0.96391
Si 0.15834 0.60628 0.65331 0.79363 0.30116 0.81381 0.72674 0.97543 0.83624 0.98663
Gr 0.02514 0.09492 0.24590 0.38503 0.23799 0.13999 0.62957 0.28286 0.86564
Ch 0.03784 0.32906 0.41469 0.27331 0.10927 0.69802 0.34844 0.92066
Br 0.04599 0.55228 0.37209 0.36614 0.46050 0.18873 0.78936
Uy 0.07334 0.56762 0.49001 0.86231 0.59356 0.94393
Se 0.31276 0.30932 0.74055 0.38563 0.87916
Be 0.07014 0.75194 0.36306 0.93611
Sk 0.82481 0.56383 0.93643
Cz 0.20000 0.82044
Nl 0.11057
TABLE C.6: CAAMn scaling: Average distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.09735 0.40966 0.14123 0.58838 0.61612 0.58557 0.85043 0.11092 0.41552 0.11946 0.51910 0.20152 0.39650 0.25389 0.13287 0.45861
Fi 0.04351 0.35011 0.23342 0.24521 0.21334 0.64307 0.31078 0.13590 0.47827 0.24283 0.34281 0.31376 0.31712 0.33150 0.74166
Pl 0.09321 0.55354 0.57673 0.52816 0.87547 0.12517 0.31186 0.21890 0.51622 0.18065 0.34107 0.18941 0.14757 0.55727
Dk 0.12727 0.10739 0.23872 0.45690 0.49039 0.34408 0.62871 0.13951 0.54174 0.45328 0.44034 0.50761 0.82775
EeI 0.08995 0.23476 0.47561 0.51604 0.36519 0.65453 0.14583 0.56573 0.47355 0.45637 0.53249 0.85558
EeII 0.31559 0.56396 0.48834 0.29685 0.63564 0.26306 0.51877 0.45609 0.45362 0.50424 0.84092
Si 0.12035 0.78621 0.71714 0.88896 0.42180 0.86111 0.75142 0.75679 0.81878 0.95440
Gr 0.04070 0.32655 0.17752 0.43189 0.16606 0.36930 0.20312 0.11543 0.46402
Ch 0.09460 0.49885 0.32350 0.30518 0.32525 0.31319 0.34490 0.76336
Br 0.04866 0.54868 0.22568 0.44326 0.33406 0.18699 0.39566
Uy 0.06401 0.50106 0.39542 0.42237 0.45469 0.73689
Se 0.29447 0.34396 0.25998 0.20101 0.51794
Be 0.39807 0.36546 0.36481 0.59617
Sk 0.28602 0.23325 0.62914
Cz 0.17667 0.52661
Nl 0.11067
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TABLE C.7: CAAMn scaling: Maximum distance D between datasets from different countries.
It Fi Pl Dk EeI EeII Si Gr Ch Br Uy Se Be Sk Cz Nl
It 0.16596 0.50374 0.26781 0.71614 0.69386 0.77979 0.90781 0.18572 0.49951 0.19006 0.57505 0.35774 0.48851 0.71299 0.30706 0.52575
Fi 0.06925 0.44934 0.33086 0.29380 0.41589 0.69992 0.35526 0.19113 0.51624 0.25757 0.46646 0.39807 0.36838 0.44178 0.74807
Pl 0.15795 0.69344 0.65574 0.77212 0.92970 0.15241 0.41221 0.29297 0.55847 0.24358 0.39807 0.68071 0.23487 0.60646
Dk 0.25816 0.22690 0.38805 0.63695 0.57707 0.46020 0.71573 0.19562 0.69262 0.60308 0.62669 0.66268 0.87907
EeI 0.12580 0.35347 0.57749 0.55147 0.40626 0.69928 0.17781 0.66887 0.55584 0.57848 0.64139 0.87960
EeII 0.46472 0.76296 0.64484 0.53917 0.77335 0.32213 0.76560 0.67811 0.70570 0.72553 0.91809
Si 0.15350 0.82560 0.78469 0.92936 0.50423 0.91929 0.83452 0.89726 0.88466 0.96836
Gr 0.04070 0.34150 0.20807 0.43647 0.21221 0.39807 0.56949 0.15117 0.48829
Ch 0.09460 0.52232 0.34134 0.44541 0.39807 0.43729 0.42843 0.76747
Br 0.05984 0.57857 0.38059 0.51411 0.71360 0.33074 0.41760
Uy 0.06401 0.55696 0.46762 0.50409 0.51926 0.75746
Se 0.29447 0.42572 0.68662 0.27888 0.65408
Be 0.39807 0.58983 0.39807 0.79575
Sk 0.60654 0.65949 0.87480
Cz 0.23837 0.58946
Nl 0.11067
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TABLE C.8: Data for parliamentary elections for several years in Italy [43], Poland [44], Finland [45], Denmark [46], Estonia [47],
Sweden [53], Belgium [54], Switzerland [50], Slovenia [48], Czech Republic [57], Greece [49], Slovakia [55, 56], Netherlands [58],
Uruguay [52] and Brazil [51] were collected. Further details regarding the individual data files are given below.
Country Year Valid Votes Voting % Data source
Italy 1958 30434681 93.83 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=25/05/1958
1972 34532535 93.21 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=07/05/1972
1976 37755090 93.39 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=20/06/1976
1979 38242918 90.62 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=03/06/1979
1987 40586573 88.83 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=14/06/1987
Poland 2001 13559412 46.29 http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl
2005 12244903 40.5 http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl
2007 16477734 53.9 http://wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
2011 15050027 48.92 http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl
Finland 1995 2803602 68.6 http://tilastokeskus.fi/tk/he/vaalit/vaalit95/risvaa.xls
1999 2710095 65.3 http://tilastokeskus.fi/tk/he/vaalit/vaalit99/ehdokas.xls
2003 2815700 66.7 http://tilastokeskus.fi/tk/he/vaalit/vaalit2003/vaalit2003_vaalitilastot_ehdokkaatverluku.xls
2007 2790752 65 http://www.stat.fi/til/evaa/2007/evaa_2007_2007-03-28_tau_015.xls
Denmark 1990 3239468 82.19 http://sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-IN/Valg/1996/FTvalg-1990/FTvalg-1990.ashx
1994 3327597 83.42 http://sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-IN/Valg/1996/FTvalg-1994/FTvalg-1994.ashx
1998 3431926 85.94 http://sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-IN/Valg/1999/FTvalg-1998/FTvalg-1998.ashx
2001 3449668 86.26 http://sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-IN/Valg/2003/FTvalg-2001/FTvalg-2001.ashx
2005 3357212 83.85 http://sum.dk/Tal-og-analyser/Valg/Folketingsvalg/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-IN/Valg/2006/FTV-2005.ashx
2007 3459420 85.99 http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FV07KAND&PLanguage=1&PXSId=0
2011 3588919 87.2 http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FV11KAND&PLanguage=1&PXSId=0
Estonia 1992 467628 67.84 http://vvk.ee/r92
1995 545825 69.06 http://vvk.ee/r95
1999 492356 57.43 http://vvk.ee/r99
2003 500686 58.2 http://vvk.ee/r03
2007 555463 61.9 http://vvk.ee/r07
2011 580264 63.5 http://www.vvk.ee/varasemad/rk2011
Sweden 2006 5551278 81.99 http://www.val.se/val/val2006/slutlig/R/rike/roster.html
2010 5960408 84.63 http://www.val.se/val/val2010/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html
Belgium 2007 6671360 86.41 http://polling2007.belgium.be/en/index-2.html
2010 6527367 84.03 http://polling2010.belgium.be/en/index.html
Switzerland 2007 2304090 46.87 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/17/02/blank/data/04/02.Document.110436.xls
2011 2485803 48.5 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/17/02/blank/data/05/02.Document.155156.xls
Slovenia 2004 991263 60.65 http://volitve.gov.si/dz2004/en/index.htm
2008 1070523 63.1 http://volitve.gov.si/dz2008/en/index.html
2011 1121573 65.6 http://volitve.gov.si/dz2011/en/rezultati/izidi_enote.html
Czech 2002 4768006 58 http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2002/psm
2006 5348976 64.47 http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2006/ps
2010 5230859 62.6 http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2010/ps
Greece 2007 7159006 72.18 http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2007/pages_en/index.html
2009 6858342 69.04 http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2009/pages/index.html?lang=en
Slovakia 1994 2875458 74.18 http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=Slovakia&opt=can
1998 3359176 83.5 http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=Slovakia&opt=can
2002 2875081 69.15 http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=Slovakia&opt=can
2010 2529385 58.83 http://app.statistics.sk/nrsr_2010
2012 2553726 59.11 http://app.statistics.sk/nrsr2012
Netherlands 2010 9416001 75.18 http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl
2012 9424235 74.57 http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl
Uruguay 2004 2229583 89.62 http://www.corteelectoral.gub.uy/nacionales20041031
2009 2303336 89.86 http://elecciones.corteelectoral.gub.uy/20091025
Brazil 2002 87474543 92.3 http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-2002/resultado-da-eleicao-2002
2006 93184830 88.9 http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-2006/resultado-da-eleicao-2006
2010 96580011 87 http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-2010/estatisticas-de-candidaturas
